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The Ethics of Patenting DNA 
 
Abstract 
 
Should DNA be patented? This paper argues that the patenting of DNA 
(whether of human or other origin) is in general acceptable and should be 
regulated by the same rules and practices as govern other patenting. 
However, patents on DNA sequences have been and are being granted too 
liberally. 
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The Ethics of Patenting DNA 
 
Is it right to patent DNA? The question continues to be an important one 
partly because DNA is being patented and partly because countries differ in 
the extent to which they allow such patenting. The position for which I shall 
argue in this paper, and have argued previously,1 is easily stated: the 
patenting of DNA (whether of human or other origin) is in general acceptable 
and should be regulated by the same rules and practices as govern other 
patenting. However, I agree with the argument that patents on DNA 
sequences have been and are being granted too liberally. My argument will 
fall into four stages. First, I consider whether or not patenting in general is 
acceptable; secondly, whether the patenting of non-human DNA is 
acceptable; thirdly, whether the patenting of human DNA is acceptable; 
fourthly, whether having a religious faith makes any difference to the 
conclusions reached. 
 
 
Is patenting acceptable? 
 
As is well known, there are slight, though significant, differences between 
countries in their legal definitions of patents. However, the essence of a 
patent is that it is awarded to allow those responsible for the invention of 
something (whether a product or a process that can result in products) to 
benefit financially from their invention by prohibiting others for limited 
periods of time (typically 20 years) from profiting, without the consent of 
those who hold the patent, from the sale of that product or process. In effect, 
if I am granted a patent for something, I have a temporary monopoly on it. I 
alone am entitled to make money from its sale, unless, of course, I choose to 
let others profit from it. 
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From an ethical standpoint, patents (along with design rights, trademarks, 
copyrights and further mechanisms that protect designers, writers, musicians, 
academics and others) are a sub-class of intellectual property rights. They 
enable the person responsible for something that is novel and desired by 
others to profit from it. In the case of patents, a number of safeguards exist 
(the precise nature and extent of which varies between countries). In 
particular, it is not permitted to patent something, such as an instrument of 
torture, that is considered contrary to morality or ordre public. Nor can 
someone be prevented from carrying out research on that which another has 
patented. Indeed, such research is made easier by the patenting process 
which requires full disclosure. Further, a patent lasts only a limited period; 
indeed, considerably less that the 50 or 70 years permitted under copyright 
laws and the virtually unlimited period of protection afforded to a registered 
trademark which continues in use. In addition, legislation exists to prevent, in 
certain circumstances, a person from sitting on a patent without exploiting it 
or from charging too much for what is patented. Greater deployment of such 
compulsory licensing and limits to fees might do much to reduce inequality 
and related injustices in the use of patents. 
 
It is possible to object to patents in themselves. For example, it might be 
argued that people shouldn‟t profit from their greater expertise or 
inventiveness, but should share the fruits of their labour among others gratis, 
from each according to their ability, as it were. Marie and Pierre Curie, for 
instance, refused to take advantage of the lucrative industry that grew up 
around their discovery and isolation of radium, believing that investigators 
should not profit from the results of their research. Before them, Michael 
Faraday could have made a fortune from his scientific discoveries but 
declined on ethical grounds. Something of this attitude persists in the non-
Celera publication of the human genome sequence in the Human Genome 
Project. Against the argument that people should not be allowed to profit 
from their greater expertise or inventiveness – no-one says that they should 
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be prohibited from voluntarily relinquishing such profits – there is the 
argument that it is wrong to prevent individuals from being allowed to 
benefit financially from their inventions. As The United Nations‟ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights puts it: 
 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.2 
 
The argument becomes one concerned with the balances between liberty and 
distributive justice. 
 
A different approach is to adopt a utilitarian perspective. The fundamental 
utilitarian argument in favour of patenting (i.e. with regard to its 
consequences) is that in the absence of patenting, individuals and companies 
would invest far less in research because the existence of patents gives patent 
holders an increased chance of getting their investment back. The research 
costs in industry are often significant, so that in the absence of patent 
protection far less research, it is maintained, would be carried out and fewer 
products would reach the market. (In certain industries, for example the food, 
tobacco, automobile and other transport equipment sectors, patents play a 
smaller role than in others industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry. 
The reasons for these inter-industry differences are complicated but are more 
to do with different ways of protecting innovation3 that with any different 
conceptions about the appropriateness or worth of protecting innovation.) 
 
Several arguments have been put forward against patenting in science in 
terms of its consequences. It has been argued that patents hinder the 
publication of scientific findings because of the time lag needed for patent 
applications to be made. It has also been argued that patenting encourages 
researchers to target their efforts where money is to be made, rather than 
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where work is most needed. On the other hand, it has been argued that any 
delay caused by patenting to the publication of scientific findings is typically 
only a matter of a few months and that, in the absence of patenting, a 
significant proportion of commercially-funded research would simply not be 
published because the best way to maximise financial return would be to 
keep secret the details of the product or process for as long as possible. 
Similarly, the argument that patenting encourages researchers to target their 
efforts where money is to be made has been countered by the assertion that 
this would be equally true in the absence of patents. 
 
As is often the case in attempting to decide an ethical question on utilitarian 
grounds, there exists genuine factual uncertainty about the precise 
consequences of abandoning the whole approach of patents. I have still to 
read any rigorous, detailed analysis of this issue. All one generally gets is one 
side arguing that the ending of the patenting system would be a great loss 
(much research would not take place, medical and other advances would be 
held back, etc.) while the other responds that it wouldn‟t be. There is still a 
lack of systematic and convincing evidence either way. However, hardly 
anyone seriously suggests that all patents should be outlawed. Arguments 
against patenting in general usually occur when someone wants to object to 
the issuing of a specific patent or set of patents and is trying to find every 
available argument to bolster their case.4 
 
 
Is the patenting of non-human DNA acceptable? 
 
In many people‟s minds there is a significant difference between patenting per 
se and the patenting of DNA. Many of the arguments against the patenting of 
non-human DNA reappear with even greater force when the question of the 
patenting of human DNA is considered, so I shall leave them till the next 
section. The question here is, is there something special about DNA that 
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means that this should prevent if being patented? We need to decide whether 
this question is to be answered using the customary „rules‟ of the patenting 
„game‟ (novelty, inventiveness, practical utility, disclosure) or whether DNA 
sits on another field of play altogether. An analogy may be helpful: we can 
ask whether there is such a thing as a distinctive sexual ethics – i.e. right set of 
ways to behave sexually – or not.5 
 
At first the answer to this analogical question may seem obvious. Surely 
sexual behaviour has its own ethics! People, at different times and in different 
cultures, argue about the acceptability of polygamy and homosexuality and 
the age of consent and whether rape can exist within marriage and so on. 
However, it can be argued that sex has no particular (i.e. distinctive) moral 
significance. Igor Primoratz, for example, holds that sex is morally neutral, so 
that moral guidance regarding sexual behaviour is provided by the same 
general moral rules and values that apply in other areas: 
 
Thus adultery is not wrong as extramarital sex, but only when it 
involves breach of promise, or seriously hurts the feelings of the non-
adulterous spouse, etc. Prostitution is not wrong as commercial sex, but 
if and when the prostitute is forced into this line of work by the lack of 
any real alternative. Pedophila is not wrong as adult-child sex but 
because even when the child is willingly participating, its willingness is 
extremely suspect in view of the radical asymmetries of maturity, 
knowledge, understanding, and power of children and adults. Sexual 
harassment is not wrong because it is sexual, but because it is harassment. 
Rape is not wrong as sexual battery, but as sexual battery.6 
 
For me, Primoratz‟ argument is convincing. Extended, it means that there is 
nothing distinctive not only about sexual ethics but about business ethics, 
about the ethics of war, or any other question – including the ethics of 
patenting DNA. Here, though, it is worth mentioning one particular objection 
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to the patenting of non-human DNA and that is that such a practice works 
only to the advantages of countries such as the USA, Japan and those in the 
European Union with a strong and well established patenting system. Other 
countries are disadvantaged. 
 
Consider, for instance, the case of the neem tree (Azadirachta indica):7 
 
The Neem is a beautiful tree. It looks really regal. It grows best in arid 
zones. The poorest of homes will have a Neem in the backyard. The 
Neem has terrific anti-malarial properties – it doesn‟t allow mosquitoes 
to come near; it doesn‟t kill mosquitoes, it numbs them and keeps them 
away. It has been used by our mothers and grandmothers; they used 
the dry leaves in clothing, so that silk and wool did not get eaten by 
worms. Neem leaves have been used in storing grain, so that, again, 
bugs don‟t get to the grain. Neem is a reliable skin treatment for all 
kinds of infection. My own little boy used to pick up infections all the 
time. The only thing that would work was the Neem oil massage I gave 
him. It is now being found to be very effective as a contraceptive. The 
Neem is a sacred tree in India. It is the olive of India. It‟s always been 
known that if you use the Neem twigs as a toothbrush, you never get 
any kind of tooth decay; but there‟s a US company that now has a 
patent on its dental care properties. There‟s a company that has a 
patent on its skin care properties; and, of course, you have about ten 
companies which have patents on its biopesticide properties. So every 
aspect of Neem that has been known in India is being treated as an 
innovation of a Western corporation.7 (p. 38) 
 
Faced with this sort of injustice, we can agree that the present workings of the 
patent system have major shortcomings when viewed from the perspective of 
global justice. (This is the case irrespective of the fact that the neem example 
does not concern the patenting of DNA itself.) Indeed, a well-known report 
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commissioned by the UN concluded in 1994 that „biopiracy‟ was cheating 
developing countries and their indigenous peoples out of some $5.3 billion a 
year.8 But this does not mean that the best way forward is necessarily to 
abandon the patenting of non-human DNA or other biological extracts. One 
alternative would be to strengthen the ability of non-Western countries to 
take out their own patents. Another would be to ensure that such countries 
entered into more bilateral arrangements with Western countries or 
multinationals to enable them to benefit financially from patents taken out on 
„their‟ species. 
 
 
Is the patenting of human DNA acceptable? 
 
The arguments in favour of patenting human genes are broadly the same as 
those in favour of patenting in general – namely that such patenting fairly 
rewards those who do the work (i.e. the patents are ethically defensible in 
themselves) and that the consequences of such patenting are of widespread 
benefit (e.g. treatments for many human disease are likely to result). These 
arguments of natural justice and the reduction of human suffering need to be 
kept in mind when objections to the patenting of human genes are 
considered. 
 
The arguments against the patenting of human genes are more numerous 
than those against patenting in general or of the patenting of non-human 
DNA. For a start, it is often assumed that patenting of human genes can be 
equated with the ownership of human genes. We no longer condone slavery – 
i.e. the ownership of one human by another – so why should we allow 
patenting? A possible response is that patenting and ownership are not the 
same thing. After all, I own many things in my home, including books, 
kitchen gadgets and even two domestic cats, but I don‟t hold patents on any 
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of them. Equally, the person who holds the patents on the various gadgets in 
your kitchen doesn‟t own them – you do. 
 
Then there is the equation of patenting with control and exploitation. The 
person who has a patent on something has control over the commercial 
exploitation of that thing. Against this it can be pointed out that things can be 
commercially exploited and controlled in the absence of patents. It has been 
argued by those in favour of the granting of patents on human genes that the 
question of whether this should be permitted needs to be kept separate from 
the question of whether particular uses of human genes in medicine or for 
any purpose should be allowed. Whether or not one finds this argument 
convincing, it may be that the existence of patents can make it easier for a 
judiciary to check whether certain moral boundaries are being transgressed 
by virtue of the fact that the granting of a patent brings that which is patented 
more clearly into the public arena. 
 
A different objection to the patenting of human genes is that this may be 
perceived as the thin end of a wedge. As is widely acknowledged, though, 
thin edge of the wedge arguments on their own are unconvincing. For one 
thing, practically every desirable thin end leads eventually to an undesirable 
thick end. Are we to ban all speech on the grounds that people often say 
hurtful things to one another? 
 
A further objection to the patenting of human genes stems from many 
people‟s unhappiness with the idea that this implies that someone has 
invented the gene in question. This objection has considerable force. After all, 
patents are given in most countries – though not all – for inventions, not 
discoveries. One may accept that a scientist can discover a human gene, but in 
what sense can a naturally occurring gene be invented? One answer to the 
objection that naturally occurring genes are not invented is to maintain that 
this is a semantic argument based on the specific historic formulation of what 
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a patent is. We could easily envisage a situation in which all countries 
allowed patents for discoveries as well as for inventions. We would still then 
have to decide whether or not the patenting, in this broader sense, of DNA 
was acceptable. 
 
A different answer is to accept that to some extent the question of the extent 
to which a gene can be invented revolves around the amount of ingenuity 
required to determine the precise sequence of bases that is the genetic code 
for that gene. 
 
The recent discussion paper produced by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics9 
is particularly helpful in this regard. In essence, the Council accepted the 
standard criteria that something should only be patented if it is novel, 
inventive, useful and disclosed. In common with a number of other writers 
they hold that „the application of these criteria to DNA sequences has not 
been sufficiently stringent‟ (p. xi). In particular, they consider that: 
 the granting of product patents which assert rights over DNA sequences 
for use in diagnosis should become the rare exception, rather than the 
norm; 
 protection by use patents of specific diagnostic tests based on DNA 
sequences could provide an effective means of rewarding the inventor 
while providing an incentive for others to develop alternative tests; 
 the granting of patents which assert rights over DNA sequences as 
research tools should be discouraged; 
 in the case of gene therapy, patent protection should be concentrated on 
developing safe and effective methods of appropriate gene delivery rather 
than on the DNA sequences themselves; 
 rights asserted over DNA sequences which are used to make new 
therapeutic proteins are generally acceptable but should be narrowly 
defined, extending only to the protein described. 
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In essence, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics hold that downstream patents 
(on actual tests and gene delivery approaches) are more acceptable than 
upstream patents on DNA sequences. Again, as I argued above when 
considering sexual ethics as a model to examine whether there are distinctive 
issues raised by the patenting of genes, there are useful analogies. One is 
internet patents. It is probably the case that early patents in this area were, as 
with patents on DNA sequences, too broad ranging. In both cases what is 
meant by „too broad ranging‟ is (albeit somewhat imprecisely) clarified by 
appeals to „the common good‟. 
 
 
Theological considerations 
 
A variety of theological positions exist about the acceptability of genetic 
engineering in general and the patenting of DNA in particular.10-13 A 
particularly powerful theological critique of the patenting of living organisms 
and of the patenting of human genes was provided by a September 1996 
submission to the European Parliament and the European Commission from 
the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society.14 This 
document makes a number of points which can be illustrated by three 
quotations. First it argues that: 
Patenting makes a implied statement about the fundamental 
relationship between humans and nature. Simply extending the rules 
for inorganic materials to the biological sphere can encourage 
inappropriate attitudes to nature. We suggest that consideration 
should be given to developing an alternative form of intellectual 
property for biological material, free from the assumptions and 
associations of a system designed originally for mechanical inventions, 
and which explicitly recognises that “inventions” affecting living 
things are in a different category from all other activities and products 
of industry and commerce. (p. 1) 
13 
 
Three points can be made. First, whether or not the patenting of biological 
material actually results in inappropriate attitudes to nature is debatable. In 
part such an assertion is open to empirical testing, though I am unaware of 
any evidence, other than anecdotal, either to support or refute it. Secondly, I 
too feel there is much to be said for the development of an alternative form of 
intellectual property for biological material. However, as I predicted in 19971, 
global agreement on this front is highly unlikely in the foreseeable (say, five 
years) future, yet the next few years are likely to be the critical ones. Thirdly, 
while I can understand why some biologists might argue that inventions 
affecting living things are in a fundamentally different category from all other 
activities and products of industry and commerce, it is perhaps less obvious 
why theologians and religious believers would. After all, every religion that 
believes in God(s) holds that everything is created and sustained by God(s), 
not just living things.  
 
Secondly, the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society 
argued that: 
We deplore the implications of the various US court decisions 
regarding patenting of living organisms that have led to the notion 
that animals, plants and living organisms generally are now thought of 
as nothing more than “products of industry”, having no more status 
than a mechanical part of a machine. This represents an unacceptable 
paradigm shift in how life forms are regarded, with respect to 
patenting. This view sees nature entirely in anthropocentric terms of 
its utility to humans, as tools and products, and has lost the sense of 
respect for animal or plant as of value in itself. This perceptions runs 
contrary to Christian understanding that all of creation owes its 
existence to God, and its significance is first of all what it is before God, 
irrespective of any use to which human beings might think of putting 
it. This seriously limits what human beings may legitimately do to 
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other living creatures, because they are God‟s first, and not ours to do 
exactly what we like with. (p. 5) 
 
Again, there are several problems with this argument. First, the passage, and 
in particular the sentence „This perceptions runs contrary to Christian 
understanding that all of creation owes its existence to God, and its 
significance is first of all what it is before God, irrespective of any use to 
which human beings might think of putting it‟, only makes sense if it uses 
„creation‟ to refer solely to living organisms. This, of course, is unacceptable 
theologically. The Earth is the Lord‟s and all that therein is. Secondly, while I 
accept that patenting presumes an anthropocentric view of nature, so do 
vaccines against human diseases, animal ownership and much else besides. I 
would argue that the anthropocentric view is a partial view, one that can be 
built on rather than rejected out of hand. Thirdly, the assertion that patenting 
of living organisms involves a loss of the sense of respect for animals or 
plants is, I would argue, no more necessarily the case than the fact that I own 
my cats means that I don‟t respect them. 
 
Thirdly, the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society 
argues that: 
Patenting of any part of the human genome is ethically abhorrent, in 
principle (p. 5) 
 
I believe in taking arguments about abhorrence extremely seriously. 
However, we cannot allow abhorrence, on its own, to be the final arbiter in 
matters of legislation. I would find it abhorrent to eat dog flesh but I would 
not approve of a law forbidding such a practice. Returning to the issue of the 
patenting of human genes, I find myself asking why such a practice is 
considered abhorrent, realising that my question belongs more to the domain 
of psychology than moral philosophy. I know I find it awful that anyone born 
with cystic fibrosis dies a premature death. I know that I find it hopeful that it 
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now seems as though genetic engineering may help prevent this from always 
being the case. I am informed by those in industry that the patenting of 
human genes is likely to lead more rapidly to such treatments and cures. I 
admit that I am not certain that this argument is correct but I would like to be 
very confident that it is false before agreeing to the prohibition of the 
patenting of human DNA. 
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